Philosophy as Search for Knowledge
In common with most of those already examined, the hypothesis I propose takes for granted to begin with that philosophy is a knowledge-seeking enterprise. In this respect, therefore, it holds that philosophy resembles the natural and other sciences, and itself is, or seeks to be, a science. This means that it is utterances, like theirs, claim to be in contrast with those of poets, priests, and prophets; that its basic function isn't to impart feelings or to edify or to exhort, but to enlighten that the task of it is professors is to teach, not to preach; that the philosopher, like the scientist, is not a pastor but an investigator. The knowledge philosophy seeks will, it's true, have bearings on man's ways of conducting his thoughts, his feelings, and his actions, for that knowledge is in part of the kind itself called wisdom and in part of the kind that furnishes the basis for a wisdom more secure than is otherwise to be had. But the philosopher's wisdom, so far as he has such knowledge, isn't to be thought of as somehow innate in his particular soul or as vouchsafed privately to him by special divine revelation. Rather, it derives from scientific study by him of the facts that are the subject matter distinctive of philosophy; and his search for knowledge is neither less nor more nor otherwise dependent on contact with concrete social or moral problems than the search for chemical or physical knowledge is dependent on contact with concrete engineering problems.
The knowledge philosophy searches, moreover, isn't knowledge in a different or less rigorous sense of the term than the knowledge sought by the other sciences. It's knowledge as contrasted with guesses, articles of faith, snap judgments, vague or unsupported opinions, prejudices, and wish-born beliefs. From this it follows that the method of philosophy must be no less scientific than that of any other knowledge-seeking enterprise, for "scientific" means nothing more and nothing less than knowledge-yielding.
But to say that the method of philosophy must be scientific doesn't imply either that philosophy must search to borrow and to build upon the results of the other sciences, or that knowledge-yielding method will, as applied to philosophical problems, take the same specific forms as when applied to the problems of, for instance, physics or biology or even mathematics. For the specific devices which make for the attainment of knowledge in each of these sciences are dictated by the specific nature of the subject matter to be dealt with, and vary even as between one and another of these sciences. We might therefore expect that this will be the case with philosophy too. Thus, when the assertion is made here that the method of philosophy must be as scientific as that of these other sciences, what is meant is that philosophy must formulate its propositions with the same regard for unambiguity, must be as scrupulous in its verification of them, and must inquire into their consequences and presuppositions as systematically as does any other science. For these are characteristics that any inquiry, no matter into what, must have if it is to have any claim to being called scientific.
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